Propagation of balance-sheet or cash-flow insolvency across financial institutions may be modeled as a cascade process on a network representing their mutual exposures. We derive rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude of contagion in a large financial network and give an analytical expression for the asymptotic fraction of defaults, in terms of network characteristics. Our results extend previous studies on contagion in random graphs to inhomogeneous directed graphs with a given degree sequence and arbitrary distribution of weights. We introduce a criterion for the resilience of a large financial network to the insolvency of a small group of financial institutions and quantify how contagion amplifies small shocks to the network. Our results emphasize the role played by "contagious links" and show that institutions which contribute most to network instability in case of default have both large connectivity and a large fraction of contagious links. The asymptotic results show good agreement with simulations for networks with realistic sizes.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the complex nature of linkages between financial institutions. From balance-sheet exposures, to more opaque obligations related to over-thecounter derivatives like credit default swaps, such linkages propagated and amplified financial distress. Initial losses in one asset class -mortgage backed securities-turned into losses that threatened the stability of the whole financial system. More than 370 of the almost 8000 US bank companies have failed since 2007. This was clearly an episode of large default contagion, if we compare to a number of 30 The acknowledgement of different types of interbank connections and the associated contagion mechanisms led to an increased advocacy to account for network effects when discussing regulatory requirements [24, 14] . In the growing body of work dedicated to systemic risk, several distress propagation mechanisms have been pinpointed, including primarily two types of insolvency: balance-sheet insolvency and cash-flow insolvency. A bank is said to be balacesheet insolvent if the value of its liabilities exceeds the value of its assets and, it is said to be cash-flow insolvent if it cannot meet its contractual payment obligations arrived at maturity.
Cascades of insolvencies can be understood as domino effects and are a type of potent financial contagion that is quantifiable.
Most investigated, balance-sheet insolvency contagion can be described as follows: party A has a balance sheet exposure to party B, where we understand by exposure the maximum loss incurred by A on its balance sheet claims upon the default of B. If B defaults, the capital of party A must absorb the corresponding loss. If the capital cannot withstand the loss, party A becomes balance sheet insolvent .
Another contagion mechanism that can be described in similar terms is represented by cascades of cash-flow insolvencies. Over-the-counter derivatives markets are prone to such type of cascades. Indeed, in these markets parties deal directly with one another rather than passing through an exchange. As such, they are subject to the risk that the other party does not fulfill its payment obligations. Consider two parties A and B, such that A has a receivable from party B upon the realization of some event. If B does not dispose of enough liquid reserves, it will default on the payment. Now consider that B has entered an off-setting contract with another party C, hedging its exposure to the random event. If C is cash-flow solvent, then the payment will flow through the intermediary B and reach A. However, if C is cash-flow insolvent and defaults, then the intermediary B might become cash-flow insolvent if it depends on receivables from C to meet its payment obligations to A. As it turns out, the length of such chains of intermediaries in certain over-the-counter markets, like the credit default swap market, is significant [15, 16] , thereby increasing the probability of a cascade of cash-flow insolvencies. 1 Some of previous work, mostly in the economics and sociology literature, investigates cascades on networks in a generic context; relevant references include Morris [42] , Kleinberg [34] , Jackson and Yariv [28] and Watts [50] . These models consider, in one form or another, a mechanism by which an agent decides to adopt one of two states depending on the state of its neighbors and a threshold which measures its susceptibility to this direct influence. Propagation of insolvency in banking networks fall under the irreversible version of this model [50, 34] ; default is not reversible, unlike the case of agents playing a network game who can revise their decisions [42] . The default threshold of a given bank depends on its level of capital (resp. liquidity reserve), the state of balance sheet (resp. cash-flow) solvency of its direct counterparties and the linkages to them. More recent work studies network formation as a result of the interplay between benefits from creating links and negative network externalities [36] .
In the finance literature, in the context of banking systems, contagion effects and network externalities have been investigated in both in theoretical [1, 10, 19, 22, 45] and empirical studies [17, 20, 49, 44] . Network externalities are -implicitly or explicitly-present in various early discussions of systemic risk (see e.g., Hellwig [25] , Kiyotaki and Moore [33] , Rochet and Tirole [46] ) through the interlinkages between balance sheets. Allen and Gale [1] pioneered the use of network models in the study of the stability of a system of interconnected financial institutions. Their results were extended in various directions by Lagunoff and Schreft [35] and Leitner [37] .
One of the central problems tackled in this literature is understanding the relation between the cascading behavior of the network and the underlying topology: Is the network such that the state of a small number of nodes will propagate to a large number of nodes, or will contagion die out quickly?
The discussion was either dominated by highly stylized networks, whose structure turns out to be quite different from the heterogenous structure of real networks -financial networks are particularly heterogenous, as many of the empirical studies [13, 47, 17 ] make a clear case-or the results were heuristic in nature and based on mean field approximations [50, 22] . Notable exceptions come from the random graphs literature, where cascade models are investigated on graphs with given degree sequences [2, 38] . One crucial aspect that does not appear in the previous literature is the heterogeneity of weights: whether interpreted as exposures or receivables, these linkages carry weights with a heavy tailed distribution. This point -corroborated by simulations [17] -prevents from reducing the analysis of contagion in banking networks to the case where a node's aggregate exposure is distributed equally across counterparties as in [22, 39] .
In light of insights coming from empirical studies and simulations, we redefine the problem as relating the cascading behavior of financial networks both to the local properties of the nodes and to the underlying topology of the network. Since balance-sheet and cash-flow insolvency cascades are similar from a mathematical modeling point of view, the challenge lies not so much in analyzing a model that is flexible enough to represent both these types of insolvency cascades, but in proposing a model that can mimic the empirical properties of these different types of networks and that is tractable enough to be able to prove theorems about the cascading behavior.
Our problem is set form the point of view of a regulator who observes the network. Our primary goal is not to identify nodes posing the highest systemic risk. Clearly, when one knows the entire network and assuming the network is fairly small, those could be identified by extensive simulations. Alternatively, for threshold models of contagion in large networks one could use approximation algorithms to find sets of most influential nodes [32, 43] . Indeed, problems like the Influence Maximization Problem have been shown NP-hard to approximate within a factor 1 − 1/e + ε for all ε > 0 [32] , but under certain sub-modularity conditions there exists a greedy 1 − 1/e − ε -approximation algorithm for this problem [43] .
The fundamental question that we tackle, unanswered so for realistic networks, is how to identify the features that make nodes systemically important. The obvious purpose is the need to set rules that would mitigate such features and consequently systemic risk.
Our approach is to consider an ensemble of networks in which one can prescribe each node's connectivity and characteristics that are relevant to the respective cascade mechanisms: balance sheet insolvency cascades depend on capital ratios and the asset side of the balance sheets; cash-flow cascades depend on liquidity reserves and cash flows related to positions in the trading book. When the number of banks is large, cascades on networks belonging to this ensemble behave in a way dictated by the prescribed characteristics.
Summary
In this paper we develop techniques for analyzing default cascades in random weighted directed networks with arbitrary degree sequences, in which a set of local features can be prescribed for each node in the network.
Our contribution is to derive rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude of contagion in such networks and give an analytical expression for the asymptotic fraction of defaults. Our results apply to a wide variety of topologies and provide analytical insights into the nature of the relation between network structure, local characteristics of nodes and contagion in large-scale networks.
For simplicity, we formulate our results in terms of balace-sheet insolvency cascades in a network of financial institutions with interlinked balance sheets, where losses flow into the asset side of the balance sheets. Similar techniques may be used for analyzing cascades of cash-flow insolvency in over-the-counter markets, as briefly discussed above and detailed in [40] . From now on, we refer to balance-sheet insolvency simply as insolvency.
Our proof is based on a coupling argument: We construct a related multigraph -a weighted configuration model-which leads to the same number of defaults as in the original contagion process but is easier to study because of its independence properties. The contagion process in this model may then be described by a Markov chain. Generalizing the differential equation method of Wormald [51] to the case where the dimension of the Markov chain depends on the size of the network we show that, as the network size increases, the rescaled Markov chain converges in probability to a limit described by a system of ordinary differential equations, which can be solved in closed form. This enables us to obtain analytical results on the final fraction of defaults in the network.
These results generalize previous ones on diffusions in random graphs with prescribed degree sequence to the case of inhomogeneous and weighted random directed graphs with arbitrary degree sequences. Related problems are the problem of existence of a giant component in random graphs [18, 41] and bootstrap percolation problem. Bootstrap percolation process 2 is a very simple models of difusions which have been studied on a variety of graphs, such as trees [8] , grids [26, 7] , hypercubes [6] , as well as on several distributions of random graphs [2, 3, 5, 31, 9] .
Another important result of our work -and probably the most important from the regulatory point of view-is the introduction of a measure of resilience of a financial network to small initial shocks. The contribution of each node to systemic risk is quantifiable in terms of its connectivity and local characteristics. Our measure may be used as a tool for stress testing the resilience of interbank networks in a decentralized way [4] and as an assessment tool of the capital adequacy of each bank with respect to its exposures.
Outline
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a model for a network of financial institutions and describes a mechanism for default contagion in such a network. Section 3 gives our main result on the asymptotic magnitude of contagion. Section 3.4 uses this result to define a measure of resilience for a financial network: We show that when this indicator of resilience crosses a threshold, small initial shocks to the network -in the form of the exogenous default of a small set of nodes-may generate a large-scale cascade of failures, a signature of systemic risk. Section 4 illustrates, through concrete examples, how the resilience measure allows us to quantify and predict the outcome of contagion on one sample network generated from a random network model that mimics the properties of a real interbank exposure network analyzed in [17] . We observe that networks with the same average connectivity may amplify initial shocks in very different manners and their resilience to contagion can vastly differ. In particular, the relation between 'connectivity' and 'contagion' is not monotonous. Technical proofs are given in Appendix A.
A network model of default contagion
In this section, we first introduce a model of a financial network, then describe the default cascade on this network, and finally the probabilistic setting we use throughout the paper.
Counterparty networks
Interlinkages across balance sheets of financial institutions may be modeled by a weighted directed graph G = (V, e) on the vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} = [n], whose elements represent financial institutions. The exposure matrix is given by e ∈ R n×n , where the ij-th entry e(i, j) represents the exposure (in monetary units) of institution i to institution j. Table 1 Note that j e(j, i) represents the interbank liabilities of i. In addition to these interbank assets and liabilities, a bank may hold other assets and liabilities (such as deposits). The net worth of the bank, given by its capital c(i), represents its capacity for absorbing losses while remaining solvent. We will refer to the ratio
Assets Liabilities Interbank assets Interbank liabilities
as the "capital ratio" of institution i, although technically it is the ratio of capital to interbank assets and not total assets.
An institution is insolvent if its net worth is negative or zero, in which case we set γ(i) = 0. • a matrix of exposures {e(i, j)} 1≤i,j≤n ,
• a set of capital ratios {γ(i)} 1≤i≤n .
In this network, the in-degree of a node i is given by
which represents the number of nodes exposed to i, while its out-degree
represents the number of institutions i is exposed to. The set of initially insolvent institutions is represented by
The next section defines the default cascade triggered by nodes in D 0 (e, γ).
Default contagion
In a network (e, γ) of counterparties, the default of one or several nodes may lead to the insolvency of other nodes, generating a cascade of defaults.
Starting from the set of initially insolvent institutions D 0 (e, γ) which represent fundamental defaults, we define a contagion process as follows.
Denoting by R(j) the recovery rate on the assets of j at default, the default of j induces a loss equal to (1 − R(j))e(i, j) for its counterparty i. If this loss exceeds the capital of i, then i becomes in turn insolvent. Recall that c(i) = γ(i)A(i). The set of nodes which become insolvent due to their exposures to initial defaults is
This procedure may be iterated to define the default cascade initiated by a set of initial defaults. 
Thus D k (e, γ) represents the set of institutions whose capital is insufficient to absorb losses due to defaults of institutions in D k−1 (e, γ).
It is easy to see that, in a network of size n, the cascade ends after at most n − 1 iterations. Hence, D n−1 (e, γ) represents the set of all nodes which become insolvent starting from the initial set of defaults D 0 (e, γ). Definition 2.3. Consider a financial network (e, γ) on the vertex set V = [n]. The fraction of defaults in the network (e, γ) (initiated by D 0 (e, γ)) is given by α n (e, γ) := |D n−1 (e, γ)| n .
The recovery rates R(i) may be exogenous or, as in Eisenberg and Noe [19] , determined endogenously by redistributing assets of a defaulted entity among debtors, proportionally to their outstanding debt. As noted in [48, 17] , the latter scenario is too optimistic since in practice liquidation takes time and assets may depreciate in value due to fire sales during liquidation. As argued in [17, 20] , when examining the short term consequences of default, the most realistic assumption on recovery rates is zero: Assets held with a defaulted counterparty are frozen until liquidation takes place, a process which can in practice take months to terminate.
For simplicity, we assume from now on that recovery rates are constant for all institutions:
A random network model
Empirical studies on interbank exposures [13, 17] show such networks to have a complex and heterogeneous structure characterized by heavy-tailed (cross-sectional) distributions of degrees and exposures. Given a description of the large-scale structure of the network in statistical terms, it is natural to model the network as a random graph whose statistical properties correspond to these observations. Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks, indexed by the number of nodes n, where
) represents the sequence of in-degrees (resp. out-degrees) of nodes in e n . We now construct a random network E n such that e n may be considered as a typical sample of E n . Definition 2.4 (Random network ensemble). Let G n (e n ) be the set of all weighted directed graphs with degree sequence d + n , d − n such that, for any node i, the set of exposures is given by the non-zero elements of line i in the exposure matrix e n . Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space. We define E n : Ω → G n (e n ) as a random directed graph uniformly distributed on G n (e n ).
We endow the nodes in E n with the capital ratios γ n . Then for all i = 1, . . . , n,
4 is equivalent to the representation of the financial system by an unweighted graph chosen uniformly among all graphs with the degree sequence (d + n , d − n ), in which we assign to the links emanating from node i the set of weights {e n (i, j) > 0}.
Asymptotic results
We consider a sequence of random financial networks as introduced above. Our goal is to study the behavior of α n (E n , γ n ) which represents the final fraction of defaults in the cascade generated by the set of initially insolvent institutions, i.e., D 0 (E n , γ n ) = {i ∈ [n] | γ n (i) = 0}.
Some probability-theoretic notation
We let N 0 be the set of non-negative integers, i.e., N 0 = N ∪ {0}. For non-negative sequences x n and y n , we describe their relative order of magnitude using Landau's o(.) and O(.) notation. We write x n = O(y n ) if there exist N ∈ N and C > 0 such that x n ≤ Cy n for all n ≥ N , and
Let {X n } n∈N be a sequence of real-valued random variables on a sequence of probability spaces {(Ω n , P n )} n∈N . If c ∈ R is a constant, we write X n p → c to denote that X n converges in probability to c. That is, for any ε > 0, we have P n (|X n − c| > ε) → 0 as n → ∞.
Let {a n } n∈N be a sequence of real numbers that tends to infinity as n → ∞. We write X n = o p (a n ), if |X n |/a n converges to 0 in probability. Additionally, we write X n = O p (a n ), to denote that for any positive-valued function ω(n) → ∞, as n → ∞, we have P(|X n |/a n ≥ ω(n)) = o (1) . If E n is a measurable subset of Ω n , for any n ∈ N, we say that the sequence {E n } n∈N occurs with high probability (w.h.p.
Also we denote by Bin(k, p) denotes a binomially distributed random variable corresponding to the number of successes of a sequence of k independent Bernoulli trials each having probability of success equal to p.
Assumptions
Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks, indexed by the number of nodes n. Let m n denote the total number of links in the network e n :
The empirical distribution of the degrees is defined by
From now on, we assume that the degree sequences d + n and d − n satisfy the following conditions analogous to the ones introduced in [41] .
} are sequences of non-negative integers with
, and such that for some probability distribution µ on N 2 0 independent of n and with finite mean λ := j,k jµ(j, k) = j,k kµ(j, k) ∈ (0, ∞), the following holds:
Note that, in particular the second assumption implies (by uniform integrability) that m n /n → λ, as n → ∞.
We now present our assumptions on the exposures. Let us denote by Σ n (i) the set of all permutations of the counterparties of i in the network e n , i.e., permutations of the set {j ∈ [n] | e n (i, j) > 0}. For the purpose of studying contagion, the role of exposures and capital ratios may be expressed in terms of default thresholds for each node. Definition 3.2 (Default threshold). For a node i and permutation τ n ∈ Σ n (i) which specifies the order in which i's counterparties default, the default threshold
measures how many counterparty defaults i can tolerate before it becomes insolvent (in the financial network (e n , γ n )), if its counterparties default in the order specified by τ n .
We also define
We will see in Section A.2 that for n large, p n (j, k, θ) gives the fraction of nodes with degree (j, k) which have a default threshold equal to θ, in the random financial network E n .
In particular for θ = 1,
is the number of exposures of nodes with degree (j, k) which exceed the capital of the exposed node, i.e., exposures which in case of default of the initial node always lead to the insolvency of the exposed node. These links play a crucial role (as we will see in Section 3.4) and we call them contagious links.
Definition 3.3 (Contagious link).
We call a link i → j contagious if it represents an exposure larger than the capital of the exposed node:
e n (i, j).
From now on, we assume that p n (j, k, θ) has a limit when n → ∞.
Assumption 3.4.
There exists a function p :
Some examples of exposures for which this assumption is fulfilled are given in Section 4.1. Under this assumption, we will see in Appendix A that p(j, k, θ) is also the limit in probability of the fraction of nodes with degree (j, k) which become insolvent after θ of their counterparties default. In particular,
• p(j, k, 0) represents the proportion of initially insolvent nodes with degree (j, k);
• p(j, k, 1) represents the proportion of nodes with degree (j, k) which are 'vulnerable', i.e., may become insolvent due to the default of a single counterparty.
The asymptotic magnitude of contagion
Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4, and let (E n , γ n ) n≥1 be their corresponding sequence of random financial networks, see Definition 2.4. Let us denote by
the distribution function of a binomial random variable Bin(j, π) with parameters j and π.
We define the function I :
Indeed, I(π) has the following interpretation (when the network size goes to infinity): If the end node of a randomly chosen edge defaults with probability π, I(π) is the expected fraction of counterparty defaults after one iteration of the cascade. Let π * be the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1], i.e.,
(The value π * represents the probability that an edge taken at random ends in a defaulted node, at the end of the contagion process.)
Remark 3.5. I admits at least one fixed point. Indeed, I is a continuous increasing function and,
So the function I has at least a fixed point in [0, 1].
We can now announce our main theorem.
Theorem 3.6. Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4, and the corresponding sequence of random matrices (E n ) n≥1 defined on (Ω, A, P) as in Definition 2.4. Let π * be the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1].
1. If π * = 1, i.e., if I(π) > π for all π ∈ [0, 1), then asymptotically almost all nodes default during the cascades
2. If π * < 1 and furthermore π * is a stable fixed point of I, i.e., I (π * ) < 1, then the asymptotic fraction of defaults is given by
A proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
Resilience to contagion
The resilience of a network to small shocks is a global property of the network which depends on its detailed structure. However, the above results allow us to introduce a rather simple and easy to compute indicator for the resilience of a network to small shocks. Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4.
Definition 3.7 (Network resilience). We define the network resilience function as
The following result, which is a consequence of Theorem 3.6, shows that this indicator measures the resilience of a network to the initial default of a small fraction ε of the nodes: Proposition 3.8. Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4, and let (E n , γ n ) n≥1 be their corresponding sequence of random financial networks, see Definition 2.4. If
then for every ε > 0 there exists N ε and ρ ε such that, if the initial fraction of defaults is smaller than ρ ε then the final fraction of defaults is negligible with high probability:
Proof. Consider ρ be defined as the fraction of fundamental defaults
We have
Using a first order expansion of β(j, α, θ) in α at 0 (when α → 0), we obtain
Thus,
Let α * be the smallest fixed point of I(α). Given Condition (4), for α > 0 and small enough, we have
where we used the fact that if the fraction of fundamental defaults tends to zero, so does the fraction of out-going links belonging to fundamentally defaulted nodes. On the other hand we have seen that I(0) ≥ 0. Thus lim ρ→0 α * = 0. Let us now fix ε > 0. By continuity of the function g defined by
appearing in Theorem 3.6, there exists ρ ε such that g(α * ) < ε/2 as soon as ρ < ρ ε . By Theorem 3.6 we have that there exists an integer N ε such that, for n ≥ N ε ,
which completes the proof.
The proof points out what is a natural and intuitive fact: If contagion does not spread to nodes with contagion threshold 1, then it will not spread at all. Theorem 3.9. Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4, and let (E n , γ n ) n≥1 be their corresponding sequence of random financial networks. If
then with high probability there exists a set of nodes representing a positive fraction of the financial system, strongly interlinked by contagious links (i.e., there is a directed path of contagious links from any node to another in the component), such that any node belonging to this set can trigger the default of all nodes in the set.
Given the network topology, Condition (4) sets limits on the fraction of contagious links p n (j, k, 1), i.e., on the magnitude of exposures relative to capital. A proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A. However, Condition 4 may be justified using the following heuristic argument.
Remark 3.10 (Branching process approximation). We describe an approximation of the local structure of the graph by a branching process, the children being the in-coming neighbors: the root φ with probability µ − (k φ ) := j µ(j, k φ ) has an in-degree equal to k φ . Each of these k φ vertices with probability
has degree (j, k), and with probability equal to p(j, k, 1) default when their parent defaults. Let y be the extinction probability, given by the smallest solution of
If j,k µ(j,k)jk λ p(j, k, 1) < 1, then the smallest solution of (6) is y = 1 (the population dies out with probability one), whereas if
there is a unique solution with y ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 3.11 (Too interconnected to fail?). We suppose that the resilience condition (4) is satisfied. Let π * ε be the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1], when a fraction ε of all nodes represent fundamental defaults, i.e., p(j, k, 0) = ε for all j, k.
We obtain then, by a first order approximation of the function I, that
By a first order approximation of the function π → j,k µ(j, k) j θ=0 p(j, k, θ)β(j, π, θ) giving the asymptotic fraction of defaults in Theorem 3.6, we obtain that, for any ρ there exists ε ρ and n ρ such that for all ε < ε ρ and n > n ρ
Suppose now that initially insolvent fraction involves only nodes with degree (d + , d − ), and we denote
Then we obtain that, for any ρ there exists ε ρ and n ρ such that for all ε < ε ρ and n > n ρ ,
This simple expression shows that there are basically two factors that determine how small initial shocks are amplified by the financial network: the interconnectedness of the initial default -represented by its in-degree d − -and the susceptibility of the network, given by the factor j,k µ(j,k)jk λ p(j, k, 1).
Numerical results on finite networks
The results of Section 3 hold in the limit of large network size. In order to assess whether these results still hold for networks whose size is large but finite, we now compare our theoretical results with numerical simulations for networks with realistic sizes. In particular, we investigate the effect of heterogeneity in network structure and the relation between resilience and connectivity. We begin by presenting some examples of models for counterparty networks which satisfy Assumption 3.4.
Examples of networks which satisfy Assumption 3.4
In this section we give two important examples of exposures which satisfy Assumption 3.4.
Example 4.1 (Independent exposures). Assume that for all n, the exposures of all nodes i ∈ [n] with the same degree (j, k), i.e.,
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, with a law given by F X (j, k), depending on j and k but independent of n. We assume the same for the sequence of capital ratios, i.e., {γ
. random variables with a law given by F γ (j, k) which may depend on (j, k), but not on n. Then it is easy to see that, by the law of large numbers, Assumption 3.4 holds and the limit p(j, k, θ) is known (for all j, k, θ), [17, 13, 47] show that they are hierarchical, 'disassortative' networks [39] , with a few large and highly interconnected dealer banks and many small banks, connected predominantly to dealer banks. This can be modeled in a stylized way by partitioning the set of nodes into two sets, a set D of n D dealer banks, and a set N of n N non-dealer banks.
We assume that the exposures {e n (i, l) > 0 | i ∈ D}, and {e n (i, l) > 0 | i ∈ N } are restrictions corresponding to the first m D n (respectively m N n ) elements of infinite sequences of exchangeable variables, where m D n and m N n denote the total number of exposures belonging to dealer and respectively non-dealer banks. Similarly, the capital ratios {γ n (i) | i ∈ D} and {γ n (i) | i ∈ N } are restrictions to the first n D (respectively n N ) elements of the sequence, independent of the sequence of exposures.
We can extend this example to a finite number of classes of nodes represented by their degrees, and also drop the assumption of independence between exposures and capital ratios. We assume that within each class, the sequence of a node's exposures and capital ratios are exchangeable random variables.
For each node i with
be a multivariate random variable with state space j,k ⊂ R j + ⊗ R. We assume that the law of the finite sequence
represents a family of finite multi-exchangeable systems, as defined by Graham [23] . It is proved in [23] that the conditional law of a finite multiclass system, given the value of the vector of the empirical measures of its classes, corresponds to independent uniform orderings of the samples within each class, and that a family of such systems converges in law if and only if the corresponding empirical measure vectors converge in law.
Let us consider the empirical measure sequence
We suppose that the family
By [23, Theorem 2], the empirical measure converges in law to
For an arbitrary Z ∈ j,k , we define the function
Thus, by Equation (10) giving the convergence of empirical measures and, the fact that the function h is bounded, we have
with Z a random element of j,k and E Λ j,k n and E Λ j,k denoting expectation under the measures Λ j,k n and Λ j,k respectively. A last observation is that Equation (9) is verified in our two tiered example since the sequences of exposures in the network of size n are restrictions of infinite exchangeable sequences.
Relevance of asymptotics
Interbank networks in developed countries may contain several thousands of nodes. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured 7969 institutions as of 3/18/2010, while the European Central Bank reports 8350 monetary financial institutions in the Euro zone (80% credit institutions and 20% money market funds). To assess the relevance of asymptotic formulae for studying contagion in networks with such sizes, we generate a scale-free network of 10000 nodes with Pareto distributed exposures using the random graph model introduced by Blanchard [11] , which can be seen as a static version of the preferential attachment model. In this model, given the sequence of out-degrees, an arbitrary out-going edge is assigned to an end-node i with probability proportional to the power d + n (i) α where α > 0. This leads to positive correlation between in-degrees and out-degrees.
The distribution of the out-degree in this model is a Pareto law with tail exponent γ + :
and the conditional limit law of the in-degree is a Poisson distribution
, where D + denotes a random variable with law µ + . The main theorem in [11] states that the marginal distribution of the in-degree has a Pareto tail with exponent
In the sequel we investigate cascades on these finite networks. A crucial ingredient is the capital ratio of each bank. Throughout this section, the capital ratio is assumed to be bounded from below by a minimal capital ratio and, we consider the worst case scenario where all nodes have a capital ratio equal to the minimal capital ratio:
The distribution of this simulated network's degrees and exposures is given in Figure 1 and is based on the empirical analysis of the Brazilian network in June 2007 [17] . On one hand we make a simulation of the default contagion starting with a random set of defaults representing 0.1% of all nodes (chosen uniformly among all nodes). On the other hand we plug the empirical distribution of the degrees and the fraction of contagious links into Equation (7) for the amplification of a small number of initial defaults. Figure 2 plots the amplification for varying values of the minimal capital ratios. We find a good agreement between the theoretical and the simulated default amplification ratios. We can clearly see that for minimal capital ratios γ min less than the critical value γ * min , the amplification ratio increases dramatically. Figure 3 plots the simulated fraction of defaults in a scale free network, starting from the initial default of a single node, as a function of the in-degree of the defaulting node, versus the theoretical slope given in Equation (8) . Recall that the theoretical slope j,k µ(j,k)jk λ p(j, k, 1) in Equation (8) measures the susceptibility of the network to initial defaults. The agreement is particularly good for nodes with large in-degrees, pointing to large amplification if such nodes were to default in a network with high susceptibility. 
The impact of heterogeneity
In the previous examples we can compute the minimal capital ratio γ * min above which the network is resilient under Condition (4). Two factors contribute to the sum in Condition (4): connectivity of the node, and its fraction of contagious links. We compare in Figure 4 , the ratio by which contagion amplifies the number of initial default in three cases: a scale free network with heterogeneous weights (exposures), a scale free network with equal weights and a 'homogeneous' random network (the Erdős-Rényi random graph where every directed edge is present with a fixed probability) with equal weights. All three networks are parameterized to have the same average degree, i.e., the same total number of links. It is interesting to note that in our example the most heterogeneous network is also the least resilient, as opposed to the homogeneous Erdös-Rényi network with the same distribution of exposures. These simulations corroborate the role played both by the network topology and the heterogeneity of weights.
Average connectivity and contagion
One of the recurrent questions in the economics literature regards the impact of connectivity on resilience to contagion: Is increased global connectivity posing a threat to financial system or does it allow for more efficient risk sharing? While an influential paper by Allen and Gale [1] finds that resilience increases with connectivity, Battiston et al. [10] exhibit different model settings where this relation is non-monotonous. Our results show nonetheless that in a model with heterogenous exposures, the average connectivity is too simple summary statistic of the topology to be explain resilience. To see this let us consider a simple example and use the asymptotic formula (7) for the amplification.
For simplicity, consider networks in which nodes' exposures are equal and 1/3 ≤ γ min < 1/2 such that p n (j, k, θ) = 1 {j=1,2} . We consider three cases of degree distributions.
First, let µ n (1, 3) = µ n (2, 3) = µ n (4, 3) = µ n (5, 3) = 1/4. The average connectivity in a network with this degree distribution is 3 and the resilience measure is equal to 1/4. Second, letμ n (1, 2) = 2/3,μ n (4, 2) = 1/3. The average connectivity is 2 and the resilience measure is equal to 1/3. Last, we takeμ n (4, 4) = 1 i.e., a regular graph with degree 4. Here the average connectivity is 4 and the resilience measure is 1.
In all three cases a network constructed with the empirical degree distribution is resilient w.h.p.. Nonetheless, we clearly observe that the resilience measure does not depend on the average connectivity in a monotonous way.
While in the case of [10] this non-monotonicity is obtained by introducing an ad-hoc mechanism of 'financial accelerators' on top of the network contagion effects, in our case it stems from an intrinsic trade-off between risk-sharing and contagion which is inherent in the model. These examples show that the resilience of a network cannot be simply assessed by examining an aggregate measure of connectivity such as the average degree or the number of links, as sometimes naively suggested in the literature, but requires a closer examination of features such as the distribution of degrees and the structure of the subgraph of contagious links.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed distress propagation in a financial system where banks strongly differ in local features, and links between financial institutions are heterogenous in nature.
We obtained an asymptotic expression for the size of a default cascade in a large network with prescribed characteristics -degree sequence and local features of the nodes-extending previous results for homogeneous undirected random graphs to heterogeneous, weighted directed networks.
Our asymptotic results were corroborated with a simulation study of contagion on a network with large but realistic size: on a given network, the spread of distress can be predicted by our measure of resilience. Our sample network has the same empirical properties as a real interbank network, e.g., the Brazilian one. As we vary the capital ratio, the point where the resilience measure becomes negative, or otherwise said where the theoretical amplification explodes, closely predicts the point where a large cascade would ensue. This illustrates how one, given an interbank network, could use the resilience measure and the theoretical amplification as a supervisory tool. This point is further developed in our follow-up paper on stress testing [4] .
The crucial question in the context of macro prudential regulation of banking systems is how to identify and mitigate those features that make nodes systemically important. We have identified institutions acting as potential hubs for default contagion as those highly connected and with a large fraction of contagious links. One natural way to mitigate the systemic impact of these nodes is to set minimal capital requirements with respect to contagious links. This point of view is different from the current capital requirements as defined by the Basel II accords. Currently, minimal capital depends on the risk weighted sum of exposures, where the risk weights are given by the counterparty default probability. However, the default probability is computed by internal models and may not take into account knock-on effects. Our results suggest that, for financial stability, minimal ratios of capital should be set with respect to contagious exposures.
While the insolvency contagion investigated in this paper has been mostly associated with balance-sheet contagion, our results may be applied to players in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contagion is carried in these markets through intermediaries with a large fraction of critical receivables defined similarly to contagious links, i.e., receivables on which the intermediary depends to meet its own payment obligations [16] . We argue that financial stability would be significantly enhanced by setting lower bounds on liquid reserves with respect to critical receivables, for those nodes which are counterparties to a large number of contracts.
Last, whereas in this paper we were concerned mostly with a network where the node's characteristics were observable, our results apply to the particular case where connectivities and weights are sequences of (exchangeable) random variables with arbitrary correlation structure. This corresponds to a setting where the modeler cannot observe the sequence of exposures, but rather has some belief over their distribution. Such a perspective would have for example a market participant who models the default probability of its counterparties and takes into consideration network effets.
In this section we present the proofs of Theorem 3.6 and 3.8. We begin by introducing a weighted configuration model -a multigraph related to the financial network-which has the same asymptotic behavior as the random financial network. We then show by a coupling argument that the default cluster in the weighted configuration model can be constructed sequentially. The contagion process in this sequential model may then be described by a Markov chain. We then generalize the differential equation method of Wormald [51] to the case where the dimension of the Markov chain depends on size of the network and we show that, as the network size increases, the rescaled Markov chain converges in probability to a limit described by a system of ordinary differential equations. We solve these equations and obtain an analytical result on the final fraction of defaults in the network. Finally, we show that, if the resilience measure is negative, the skeleton of contagious links percolates.
Consider a sequence (e n , γ n ) n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4.
A.1 Link with the configuration model
A standard method for studying random graphs with prescribed degree sequence is to consider (see e.g., [12, 41, 29] ) a related random multigraph with the same degree sequence, known as the configuration model [12] , then condition on this multigraph being simple. The configuration model in the case of random directed graphs has been studied by Cooper and Frieze [18] . Proceeding analogously, we introduce a multigraph with the same degrees and exposures as the network defined above, but which is easier to study because of the independence properties of the variables involved. Conditioned on being a simple graph, it has the same law as the random financial network defined above.
Definition A.1 (Configuration model). Given a set of nodes [n] = {1, . . . , n} and a degree sequence (d + n , d − n ), we associate to each node i two sets: H + n (i) representing its out-going halfedges and H − n (i) representing its in-coming half-edges, with
A configuration is a matching of H + n with H − n . To each configuration we assign a graph. When an out-going half-edge of node i is matched with an in-coming half-edge of node j, a directed edge from i to j appears in the graph. The configuration model is the random directed multigraph G * n (e n ) which is uniformly distributed across all configurations ( Figure 5 ).
It is easy to see that, conditional on being a simple graph, G * n (e n ) is uniformly distributed on G n (e n ). Thus, the law of G * n (e n ) conditional on being a simple graph is the same as the law of E n .
In particular any property that holds with high probability (with probability tending to 1 as n → ∞) for the random multigraph G * n (e n ), holds with high probability on the random network E n provided lim inf
In particular, the condition (11), see [30] .
Remark A.2. Janson [30] has studied, in the case of undirected graphs, the probability of the random multigraph to be simple. One can adapt the proof to the directed case and show that the condition (11) . Indeed, in the non-directed case, Janson [30] proves that when m n :=
where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; λ ij :=
. The proof of these results is based on counting vertices with at least one loop and, pairs of vertices with at least two edges between them, disregarding the number of parallel loops or edges. The same argument applies to the directed case, and one can show that when m n :=
where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n;
One can observe that a uniform matching of half-edges can be obtained sequentially: choose an in-coming half-edge according to any rule (random or deterministic), and then choose the corresponding out-going half-edge uniformly over the unmatched out-going half-edges. The configuration model is thus particularly appropriate for the study of contagion, as we will see in the proofs, since we can restrict the matching process to choosing only in-coming half-edges entering defaulted nodes. In doing so, one constructs directly the contagion cluster in the random graph given by the configuration model and endowed with the sequence of capital ratios.
Due to this property, it is easier to study contagion on G * n (e n ) under conditions on the degree sequence for the assumption above (11) to hold, then translate all results holding with high probability to the initial network E n defined in Definition 2.4.
A.2 Coupling
We are given the set of nodes [n] and their sequence of degrees (d + n , d − n ). For each node i, we fix an indexing of its out-going and in-coming half-edges, ranging in
respectively. Furthermore, all out-going half-edges are given a global label in the range [1, . . . , m n ], with m n the total number of out-going (in-coming) half-edges. Similarly, all in-coming half-edges are given a global label in the range [m n ].
Recall that Σ n (i) denotes the set of all permutations of the counterparties of i in the network e n . The set of weights on the links exiting node i is given by
For the sequence of edge weights and capital ratios, (e n , γ n ), we generate the random graph G n (e n , γ n ), by the following algorithm:
1. For each node i, choose a permutation τ i n ∈ Σ n (i) uniformly at random among all permutations of node i's out-going half edges.
2. Color all in-coming and out-going half-edges in black. Define the set of initially defaulted nodes
{i}. 4. Choose a random uniform matching of the remaining out-going half-edges and match them to the remaining in-coming half-edges in increasing order and color them all in red.
Set for all nodes
Lemma A.3. The random graphG n (e n , γ n ) has the same distribution as G * n (e n ). Furthermore the set D f at the end of the above algorithm is the final set of defaulted nodes in the graph G n (e n , γ n ) (endowed with capital ratios γ n ).
Proof. The second claim is trivial. Let us prove the first claim. For a set A, we denote by Σ A the set of permutations of A. Let σ + n and σ − n be the random permutations in Σ [mn] , representing the order in which the above algorithm selects the in-coming / out-going edges. At step k of the above construction, in-coming half-edge with global label σ − n (k) is matched to out-going half-edge with global label σ + n (k) to form an edge. The permutation σ + n is determined by the set of permutations (τ i n ) i=1,...,n and the sequence π n of size m n , representing the (ordered) sequence of nodes selected at Step 3b (or Step 4 when the set of in-coming black half-edges belonging to nodes in D k−1 is empty -assume we choose sequentially uniformly at random) of the algorithm (each node i appears in sequence π n exactly d + n (i) times). It is easy to see that σ + n is a uniform permutation among all permutations in Σ [mn] , since (τ i n ) i=1,...,n are uniformly distributed and at each step of the algorithm we choose a node with probability proportional to its black out-going half-edges. On the other hand, the value of σ − n (k) depends in a deterministic manner on (e n , γ n , σ
The out-going half-edge with global label j is matched with the in-coming half-edge with global label (σ − n • (σ + n ) −1 )(j). In order to prove our claim it is enough to prove that the permutation (σ − n • (σ + n ) −1 ) is uniformly distributed among all permutations of m n . Indeed, for an arbitrary permutation ξ belonging to the set Σ [mn] , we have that
Indeed, conditional on the knowledge of (σ + n (1), . . . , σ + n (j −1)), σ − n (j) is deterministic. Also, by conditioning on
In the above algorithm, σ + n (j) has uniform law over T . Then the probability to choose ξ −1 (σ − n (j)) is 1 mn−j+1 . By the law of iterated expectations, we obtain that
This and the fact that the last step of the algorithm is a conditionally uniform match conclude the proof.
We can find the final set of defaulted nodes D f of the above algorithm in the following manner: once the permutation τ i n is chosen, assign to each node its corresponding threshold θ n (i) = Θ n (i, τ i n ) as in Definition 3.2, and forget everything about (e n , γ n ).
Definition A.4. Denote byG n (d + n , d − n , θ n ) the random graph resulting from the above algorithm, in which we replace Step 3b of the algorithm by the fact that node i defaults the first time it has θ n (i) out-going half-edges colored in red, i.e., at step inf{k ≥ 1, such that θ n (i) = #{1 ≤ l ≤ k, π n (l) = i}}.
Corollary A.5. The random graphG n (d + n , d − n , θ n ) has the same law as the unweighted skeleton ofG n (e n , γ n ).
Let N n (j, k, θ) denote the number of nodes with degree (j, k) and threshold θ after choosing uniformly the random permutations τ n in the above construction.
Lemma A.6. We have (as n → ∞)
Proof. For any node i with with degree (j, k), the probability that its default threshold Θ n (i, τ i n ) be equal to θ is
Then we have
where Be(·) denotes a Bernoulli variable. By Assumption 3.4 we have
Now it is easy to conclude the proof by Chebysev's inequality.
A.3 A Markov chain description of contagion dynamics
In the previous section, we have replaced the description based on default rounds by an equivalent one based on successive bilateral interactions. By interaction we mean matching an in-coming edge with an out-going edge. At each step of the algorithm described in last section, we have one interaction only between two nodes (banks), yielding at most one default. This allows for a simpler Markov chain which leads to the same set of final defaults.
We describe now the contagion process on the unweighted graphG n (d + n , d − n , θ n ) with thresholds (θ n (i) = Θ n (i, τ i n )) 1≤i≤n in terms of the dynamics of a Markov chain. At each iteration we partition the nodes according to their state of solvency, degree, threshold and number of defaulted neighbors. Let us define S j,k,θ,l n (t), the number of solvent banks with degree (j, k), default threshold θ and l defaulted debtors before time t. We introduce the additional variables of interest:
• D j,k,θ n (t): the number of defaulted banks at time t with degree (j, k) and default threshold θ,
• D n (t): the number of defaulted banks at time t,
• D − n (t): the number of black in-coming edges belonging to defaulted banks, for which it is easy to see that the following identities hold:
Because at each step we color in red one out-going edge and the number of black out-going edges at time 0 is m n , the number of black out-going edges at time t will be m n − t . By construction, Y n (t) = S j,k,θ,l n (t)
represents a Markov chain. Let (F n,t ) t≥0
be its natural filtration. We define the operator ∧ as
The length of the default cascade is given by
A.4 A law of large numbers for the contagion process
Define the following set of differential equations denoted by (DE):
, with initial conditions
Lemma A.8. The system of differential equations (DE) admits the unique solution
, in the interval 0 ≤ τ < λ, with
Proof. We denote by DE K the set of differential equations defined above, restricted to j ∧k < K and by b(K) the dimension of the restricted system. Since the derivatives of the functions s j,k,θ,l (τ ) j∧k<K,0≤l<θ≤j depend only on τ and the same functions, by a standard result in the theory of ordinary differential equations [27, Ch.2, Thm 11], there is an unique solution of DE K in any domain of the type (−ε, λ) × R, with R a bounded subdomain of R b(K) and ε > 0. The solution of (DE) is defined to be the set of functions solving all the finite systems (DE K ) K≥1 . We solve now the system DE. Let u = u(τ ) = −ln(λ − τ ). Then u(0) = −ln(λ), u is strictly monotone and so is the inverse function τ = τ (u). We write the system of differential equations (DE) with respect to u:
and by induction, we find
By going back to τ , we have
Then, by using the initial conditions, we find
where z n (t) = (z 1 n (t), . . . , z b n (t)) is the solution of
We apply this lemma to the contagion model described in Section A.3. Let us define, for
with s j,k,θ,l given in Lemma A.8. With Bin(j, π) denoting a binomial variable with parameters j and π, we have
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.6
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.6 whose aim is to approximate the value D n (T n )/n as n → ∞. We base the proof on Theorem A.9. However, several difficulties arise since in our case since the number of variables depends on n. We first need to bound the contribution of higher order terms in the infinite sums (17) and (18) . Fix ε > 0. By Condition 3.1, we know
Then, there exists an integer K ε , such that
It follows that
The number of vertices with degree (j, k) is nµ n (j, k). Again, by Condition 3.1,
Therefore, for n large enough, j∧k≥Kε kµ n (j, k) < ε, and
For K ≥ 1, we denote
and
, both of dimension b(K), where δ j,k,θ (τ ), s j,k,θ,l (τ ) are solutions to a system (DE) of ordinary differential equations. Let
For the arbitrary constant ε > 0 we fixed above, we define the domain U ε as
The domain U ε is a bounded open set which contains the support of all initial values of the variables. Each variable is bounded by a constant times n (C 0 = 1). By the definition of our process, the Boundedness condition is satisfied with β(n) = 1. The second condition of the theorem is satisfied by some λ 1 (n) = O(1/n). Finally the Lipschitz property is also satisfied since λ − τ is bounded away from zero. Then by Lemma A.9 and by using Lemma A.6 for convergence of initial conditions, we have :
Corollary A.10. For a sufficiently large constant C, we have
uniformly for all t ≤ nσ C (n) where
When the solution reaches the boundary of U ε , it violates the first constraint in 21, determined byτ = λ − ε. By convergence of mn n to λ, there is a value n 0 such that ∀n ≥ n 0 , mn n > λ − ε, which ensures thatτ n ≤ m n . Using (19) and (20), we have, for 0 ≤ t ≤ nτ and n ≥ n 0 :
We obtain by Corollary A.10 that
We nw study the stopping time T n defined in (13) and the size of the default cascade D n (T n ). First assume I(π) > π for all π ∈ [0, 1), i.e., π * = 1. Then we have
We have then that T n /n =τ + O(ε) + o p (1) and from convergence (26) , since δ(τ ) = 1 − O(ε), we obtain by tending ε to 0 that |D n (T n )| = n−o p (n). This proves the first part of the theorem. Now consider the case π * < 1, and furthermore π * is a stable fixed point of I(π). Then by definition of π * and by using the fact that I(1) ≤ 1, we have I(π) < π for some interval (π * , π * +π). Then δ − (τ ) is negative in an interval (τ * , τ * +τ ), with τ * = λπ * .
Let ε such that 2ε < − inf τ ∈(τ * ,τ * +τ ) δ − (τ ) and denoteσ the first iteration at which it reaches the minimum. Since δ − (σ) < −2ε it follows that with high probability D − (σn)/n < 0, so T n /n = τ * + O(ε) + o p (1). The conclusion follows by taking the limit ε → 0.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.9
Strong connectivity sparse random directed graphs with prescribed degree sequence has been studied by Cooper and Frieze in [18] . Let λ n represent the average degree (then by Condition 3.1, λ n → λ as n → ∞), and µ n (j, k) represent the empirical distribution of the degrees, assumed to be proper (as defined below), then [18, Theorem 1.2] states that if
then the graph contains w.h.p. a strongly connected giant component. We remark that the theorem above is given in [18] under stronger assumptions on the degree sequence, adding to Assumption 3.1 the following three conditions, in which ∆ n denotes the maximum degree:
). If ∆ n → ∞ with n then ρ n = o(∆ n ).
• ∆ n ≤ n 1/12 log n .
• As n → ∞, ν n → ν ∈ (0, ∞).
Following [18] we call a degree sequence proper if it satisfies Assumption 3.1 together with the above conditions. A first reason for adding these conditions in [18] is to ensure that Equation (11) holds. However, following Janson [30] , the restricted set of conditions 3.1 is sufficient. The second reason is that [18] gives more precise results on the structure of the giant component. For our purpose, to find the sufficient condition for the existence of strongly connected giant component, we show that these supplementary conditions may be dropped.
It is easy to see that a bounded degree sequence (i.e., ∆ n = O(1)) which satisfies Assumption 3.1 is proper. We use this fact in the following. 
then with high probability the graph contains a strongly connected giant component.
Proof. By the second moment property and Fatou's lemma, there exists a constant C such that
Then, it follows that for arbitrary ε > 0, there exists a constant ∆ ε such that j∧k>∆ε jkµ(j, k) ≤ ε.
Thus, by choosing ε small enough, there exists a constant ∆ ε such that j∧k≤∆ε jk µ(j, k) λ > 1.
We now modify the graph such that the maximum degree is equal to ∆ ε : for every node i such that d + n (i) ∧ d − n (i) > ∆ ε , all its in-coming (resp. out-going) half-edges are transferred to new nodes with degree (0, 1) (resp. with degree (1, 0)). Since these newly created nodes cannot be part of any strongly connected component, it follows that, if the modified graph contains such a component, then necessarily the initial graph also does. It is then enough to evaluate Equation (27) for this modified graph, which by construction verifies the Assumption 3.1 for the new empirical distributionμ with the average degreeλ. Also, since the degrees of the modified graph are bounded, the supplementary conditions above also hold, i.e., the degree sequence is proper, and we can apply The last equality follows from the fact that for 0 < j, k ≤ ∆ ε , we havẽ
This is true since the total number of edges, and the number of nodes with degree j, k for 0 < j, k ≤ ∆ ε , stays unmodified.
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.9. Our proof is based on ideas applied in [21, 29] for site and bond percolation in configuration model. Our aim is to show that the skeleton of contagious links in the random financial network is still described by configuration model, with a degree sequence verifying Assumptions 3.1, and then apply Lemma A.11.
For each node i, the set of contagious out-going edges is given by C n (i) := {l | (1 − R)e n (i, l) > γ n (i)}.
Let us denote their number by c + n (i) := #C n (i). We denote by G c n the unweighted skeleton of contagious links in the random network G * n (e n ), endowed with the capital ratios γ n .
In order to characterize the law of G c n , we adapt Janson's method [29] for the directed case.
Lemma A.12. The unweighted skeleton of contagious links G c n has the same law as the random graph constructed as follows: 3. Delete n + = n − n randomly chosen nodes with out-degree 1 and in-degree 0.
Proof. The skeleton G c n can be obtained in a two-step procedure. First, disconnect all noncontagious links in G * n (e n ) from their end nodes and transfer them to newly created nodes of degree (1, 0) . Then delete all new nodes and their incident edges. The first step of this procedure may be dubbed as "rewiring". Looking at graphs as configurations, and since the first step changes the total number of nodes but not the number of half-edges, it is easy to see that there is a one to one correspondence between the configurations before and after the "rewiring". Thus, the graph after rewiring is still described by the configuration model, and has the same law as G * n (d
− n ). Finally, by symmetry, the nodes with out-degree 1 and in-degree 0 are equivalent, so one may remove randomly the appropriate number of them.
Note that since the degree sequence before rewiring verifies Condition 3.1, so does the degree sequence after rewiring. Moreover, since we are interested in the strongly connected component and nodes of degrees (1, 0) will not be included, we can actually apply Lemma A.11 to the random graph resulting by the above contagion process. Hence, we may study the strongly connected component in the intermediate graph
− n ). Let us denote by l n (j, k), the number of nodes with out-degree j and in-degree k in the graph G * n (d
− n ), and byλ n , the average degree. Then the average directed degree in this random graph is given by ν n := j,k jkl n (j, k)/(λ n n ).
We first observe thatλ n n = λn, since the number of edges is unchanged after rewiring of the links. For every k > 0, the quantity j jl n (j, k) represents the number of out-going edges belonging to nodes with in-degree k in the graph after rewiring, which in turn represents the number of contagious out-going edges belonging to nodes with in-degree k in the graph before rewiring. But so does j p n (j, k, 1)nµ n (j, k)j. So, for all k j j l n (j, k) λ n n = 1 λ n n j p n (j, k, 1)nµ n (j, k)j 
